Introduction
As confirmed in numerous empirical studies, social capital can have sizeable effects on individuals' earnings. In particular, under the network operationalization of social capital (Lin, 2001; Sobel, 2002; Kadushin, 2012) and following Putnam's (2000) distinction between bridging social capital (social ties with dissimilar others) and bonding social capital (social ties with similar others), these two types of social capital have been found to have opposing influences on earnings. But for a few exceptions, it is usually argued that bridging social capital increases earnings whereas bonding social capital decreases them.
Results of these studies are reviewed in Table 1 . 1 In this paper, we revisit these earlier empirical findings on the basis of worldwide World and European Values Surveys (WVS and EVS) data. Our claim is that the literature has in fact overlooked the possibility of a nonlinear impact of both social capital measures on individuals' earnings. This can be viewed as a potentially important gap in the literature because, as hypothesized by Growiec and Growiec (2010, 2014b) on the basis of theoretical models, there are reasons to seek an inverted-U shaped relationship between bridging social capital and earnings. On the one hand, bridging social ties can be a source of valuable resources, increasing one's earning potential; on the other hand, maintaining social ties necessarily incurs time costs and thereby at the margin, limits the potential for additional earnings. According to the models, if the individual's investment in social ties is sufficiently high ("too high"), these time costs can outweigh the pecuniary benefits of bridging social capital. Bonding social capital, on the other hand, does not provide the resource advantages typical for bridging ties, while still requiring one to incur the time costs, and thus its impact on earnings is hypothesized to be unambiguously negative.
The current study provides a robust empirical confirmation of the aforementioned theoretical hypotheses. Based on data on a cross section of individuals surveyed in the 1 Table 1 reviews only studies where network operationalizations of social capital were adopted. We are particularly interested in articles acknowledging the distinction between bridging and bonding social capital. For this reason we omit the studies which take social trust as the key explanatory variable, and those which include some measures of trust as components of their social capital operationalizations (e.g., Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001) . In several cases, we have renamed some variables to keep them as close as possible to the current study. and a wide range of other social characteristics. We find that bridging social capital indeed has an inverted-U shaped impact on earnings, whereas the impact of bonding social capital is unambiguously negative and roughly linear. We also confirm that social trust is positively related to individuals' earnings.
The methodological strength of our empirical analysis lies with the fact that in addition to looking for nonlinear effects, we are also very careful in controlling for the potential presence of omitted variables and the endogeneity of social capital variables in earnings regressions. We tackle the problem of social capital endogeneity by applying the instrumental variables (IV) estimation technique. By carefully testing the validity and identification properties of instrumental variables used in each regression specification, we sort out several empirical caveats arising in the related literature due to the endogeneity of social capital in earnings regressions. We also identify an important role of several confounding variables, able to influence both sides of the estimated equation. We conclude that omitting these variables and disregarding the endogeneity problem could have biased some of the earlier results, but it does not affect the main empirical finding of the current study: that the impact of bridging social capital on individuals' earnings has the inverted-U shape.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant theoretical literature underlying our empirical investigation. Section 3 discusses the impor- 
Related literature
Regarding the underlying definition of social capital, we build on the principal idea to operationalize bridging and bonding social capital via the characteristics of individuals' social networks (cf. Lin, 2001) . Such an approach is especially fruitful analytically because it enables one to delineate people's objective behavior (maintaining social contacts with others) from social norms (trust, reciprocity). Indeed, definitions which fail to acknowledge this distinction have been forcefully criticized in the literature, with the implication that they may even render the entire social capital concept defective (Bjørnskov and Sønderskov, 2013 bridging social capital is often measured as the frequency of social contact with people in a different social-economic position to oneself. In large-scale survey datasets such as the WVS and EVS used here, however, there always remains the problem of data availability.
In the current paper, this problem forced us to rely on a proxy operationalization of bonding social capital via declarations of importance of family in one's life and the content of the role of parent that one holds (see also Alesina and Giuliano, 2010).
Our main empirical hypotheses, on the other hand, are rooted in the theoretical literature which deals with the impact of social capital and trust on economic performance at the level of individuals, communities, regions, and whole countries. Some sociologists argue that bridging social capital, as opposed to bonding social capital, goes together with civil liberties and the support for gender and racial equality, and strengthens the functioning of democracy by reducing corruption (Putnam et al., 1993; Putnam, 2000 Moreover, in the latter contribution we argue that bridging social capital and social trust can also form virtuous and vicious circles, leading to multiple equilibria in economic performance. In one of the extensions of our main empirical study, we test these predictions 10 empirically by checking the signs and statistical significance of interaction terms between both types of social capital, trust, and employment status, leading to mixed results.
An extended review of the background literature can also be found in our two closely related studies (Growiec and Growiec, 2014a,b or twice a month, only a few times in a year, not at all. The choice of this summary scale is optimal in the sense that Cronbach's alpha analysis shows that its validity cannot be improved by removing any of its constituent items. Our approach is also justified by the fact that factor analysis confirms that the scale is unidimensional, and all items are included in the primary factor with similar loadings.
Bonding social capital, on the other hand, is operationalized as the strength of family 2 Since most of the variables feature (at least some) missing data, the exact number of observations in each given regression specification depends on the choice of regressors and instruments. As a robustness check, we have also compared our main results against a few additional regressions where some of the relevant regressors with most missing values (such as household size) were dropped. In that case we were able to use 35-50 thousand observations from 68 countries. Our main results remain virtually unchanged. We simultaneously monitor individuals' self-reported social trust, measured by their choice among two statements: "Most people can be trusted" or "One can't be too careful
[with other people]". We shall also distinguish between individuals' own level of trust towards strangers and the degree to which they themselves are trusted. As a proxy measure of the latter, we shall use the average level of trust in the individuals' reference group. We stratify individuals by their country of residence and education level.
Measurement of earnings
Our dependent variable is constructed on the basis of the WVS ten-degree scale of total household income. The exact survey question used to this end is: "Here is a scale of incomes. We would like to know in what group your household is, counting all wages, salaries, pensions, and other incomes that come in. Just give the letter of the group your household falls into, before taxes and other deductions." Respondents are asked to identify the earnings decile to which their household belongs. 3 We work with a measure of attitudes here because, unfortunately, no relevant variables measuring actual behaviors of respondents are available in the WVS dataset. Additional justifications for the current proxy operationalization of bridging and bonding social capital can be found in Growiec and Growiec (2014a) as well as K. Growiec (2011).
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To bring this measure as close as possible to a measure of individuals' earnings, we transform the aforementioned WVS scale into a scale of equivalent household earnings. To this end, we divide total household income by the square root of the total number of persons in the household, including children. 4 As the explained variable in our preferred regression equation, we take the natural logarithm of such a measure (denoted as income ln eq). This approach allows us to treat our model as a Mincerian earnings equation.
As a robustness check, we confirm that our main findings are robust to replacing this variable with the original WVS measure of household incomes, its logarithm, as well as household income per person in the household. They also remain in force when the model is estimated as an ordered logit, i.e., when the explained variable is treated as an ordinal
and not an interval scale. Histograms presented in Figure 1 reveal that the distribution of household earnings tend to be right-skewed despite the fact that respondents were supposed to divide themselves in deciles. This can be a consequence of cognitive bias of respondents in the sample (e.g., due to comparing one's wage to the mean instead of the median wage in the population) or a systematically wider incidence of missing data from households located in upper deciles of the income distribution. Upon applying the logarithmic transformation, 4 The approach to computing equivalent incomes by dividing total household incomes by the number of its members taken to a power α ∈ [0, 1] has been first proposed by Buhmann et al. (1988) . The square root assumption (α = 0.5) is likely the most popular parametrization.
we obtain a left-skewed distribution, though. This property is shared also by log equivalent earnings, our dependent variable.
Since our explained measure is naturally sensitive to the number of adult persons in the household, we control for household size (hh size: number of persons aged 18+ in the household) in all our regressions. Given that the WVS definition refers to income deciles within the respondent's country, we always include country fixed effects.
Instrumental variables
If there is regressor endogeneity, i.e., if apart from the sought causal link from individuals' bridging and bonding social capital stocks to their earnings there also exists a reverse causal link from earnings to social capital, the strength of the actual impact of both social capital variables can only be identified thanks to an auxiliary use of instrumental variables. Such variables, by construction, should be exogenous, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term of the estimated regression equation, and sufficiently strongly correlated with the endogenous regressors.
Although it is an admittedly hard task to find good (i.e., both exogenous and strong) instruments for bridging and bonding social capital in cross-sectional data, our results indicate that we have succeeded in finding such variables. Our final list includes three measures of religiosity (survey questions: "How often do you attend religious services?", "Do you get comfort and strength from religion?", and "Is religion important in your life?"), and two measures of interest in politics (survey questions: "How often do you discuss political matters with friends?" and "Is politics important in your life?").
The IV procedure has been carried out in the following way. 5 We begin with es- 
Results
Let us now proceed to the presentation of our principal results. We shall first provide a graphical demonstration of the inverted-U relationship between bridging social capital and individual earnings. We shall also argue that for bonding social capital, this relationship is unambiguously negative. In the second subsection, we will provide our main set of empirical results which confirms robustness of this result to a range of control variables and the endogeneity of both social capital variables. Further extensions and robustness checks are relegated to the consecutive section.
Bridging and bonding social capital vs. earnings: Empirical evidence for the inverted U
To visualize the nonlinear effects of bridging social capital on individual earnings, we have carried out a simple two-step procedure. In the first step, we have regressed a range of explanatory variables -all variables from Regression (4) in Table 2 The striking property of our findings is that the data strongly favor a non-monotonic, inverted-U shape of the relationship between bridging social capital and (residual) earnings. In fact, this regression can be just as well fitted with a very parsimonious quadratic specification.
Furthermore, as demonstrated in the right panel of Figure 2 , the shape of the bridging social capital-earnings relationship remains essentially unaffected when one limits the number of control variables in the regression. The respective parabolas illustrate the quadratic regressions of bridging social capital on residual earnings, with residuals computed taking explanatory variables from Regressions (1)-(4) in Table 2 , respectively. The only important difference is that the maximum appears shifted to the right (i.e., the range An analogous procedure has been also carried out with respect to bonding social capital, with strikingly different results. As shown in Figure 3 , the relationship between bonding social capital and (residual) earnings is unambiguously negative, with the possible exception of the range of lowest bonding social capital levels, where the relationship appears roughly flat. This exception is however subject to substantial uncertainty given the relative rarity of respondents with such characteristics in the data. Furthermore, as demonstrated in the right panel of Figure 3 , the shape of this relationship remains essentially unaffected when one limits the number of control variables in the regression. The respective lines illustrate kernel-weighted local polynomial regressions of bonding social capital on residual earnings, with residuals computed taking explanatory variables from Regressions (1)-(4) in Table 2 , respectively. It is confirmed that, with the possible exception of the range of lowest bonding social capital levels, the discussed relationship is negative and linear.
This finding can be viewed as an empirical confirmation of Proposition 2 in Growiec and Growiec (2010), stemming from a theoretical model. It is also in line with a host of related literature, reviewed in Table 1 . A tentative conclusion from this result might be that unless individuals get out of closed kinship groups and in-group loyalty, they will face certain limitations in their prospects for financial success. A further interpretation of this result is that strong family ties may restrict the scope of exploration of the labor market by an individual and limit searching for a job on a competitive basis. Instead, individuals would rely on job opportunities offered by the members of the kinship group 19 that are usually limited and might be not in line with their qualifications or expectations.
Bridging and bonding social capital and social trust as determinants of individual earnings
The key regression results of the current study are contained in Table 2 . Models (1)- (4) have been estimated with OLS. By gradually increasing the number of relevant control variables from one equation to another, we quantify the extent to which the initial estimates have been affected by omitted variables bias. Models (5)- (8), on the other hand, have been estimated with instrumental variables (IV), allowing us to control for endogeneity of bridging and bonding social capital in earnings regressions. Indeed, our Chi-square endogeneity tests confirm that bridging and bonding social capital are correlated with the error term in the OLS regressions, and thus one should expect OLS results to be biased.
As shown in Table 2 , the result of an inverted-U shaped impact of bridging social capital on earnings and an unambiguously negative impact of bonding social capital is robust to controlling for social capital endogeneity and confounding variables. Statistical significance at 1% level is maintained for all regression specifications. 6 Our another finding is that earnings are also positively related to social trust, even when (endogenous) social capital stocks are controlled for. This result refers to the extent to which one trust others but not to the level to which she experiences trust in return (cf.
Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001 ). On average, and keeping other things equal, the more individual trusts others, the better is she off. It supports the idea that social trust enhances incomes by opening individuals to more beneficial situations (K. 
21
freedom of choice and control over one's actions and living in a stable relationship. We find that better education, being employed, living in a stable relationship, and residing in a bigger town or city go together with higher income. The relation between age and income is generally inverse U-shaped (though not robustly so), which means that the youth entering the job market, lacking work experience, are paid less than older cohorts. The opposite is true for older people, who despite their abundant experience, get paid less for their work than the middle-aged cohort, too. Both the number of children (children) and adult persons in the household (hh size) have a negative impact on equivalent income of the household. The latter outcome can be interpreted that the data perhaps favor a somewhat less sharp discounting of income by the number of household members in the computation of equivalent income than the one we have used in the current analysis. On average, women earn less than men. (4) and (8) are considered, we obtain a few puzzling results. Namely, it turns out that controlling for a range of individual characteristics, housewife, student, and retired status goes together with higher earnings.
As far as further control variables included in Regressions
Finally, we also control if the respondent declares to be the chief wage earner of the household, and whether the chief wage earner is employed (which has a differential impact from the respondent's employment status only if the respondent is not the chief wage earner). As expected, the latter variable robustly positively affects individuals' earnings. Surprisingly, however, chief wage earners tend to have lower earnings than non-chief wage earners. This last result is a consequence of the fact that already in the raw data, household incomes and equivalent incomes are (according to t-tests) actually statistically significantly lower for chief wage earners (predominantly men, often living alone). Earnings per person in the household are significantly higher if the respondent is a chief wage earner, though, because on average, chief wage earners tend to live in smaller households.
Robustness checks
The purpose of the current section is to provide additional extensions and robustness checks for our main set of results. It turns out that our main result is robust to: (a) including an extended set of countries (which is possible thanks to eliminating control variables with most missing values), (b) estimating the regression models with an ordered logit estimator, (c) using different definitions of individuals' earnings as the explained variable, and (d) restricting the sample to chief wage earners. We also address the question of possible interaction effects between bridging and bonding social capital, trust, and employment status (Growiec and Growiec, 2014b).
Larger set of countries
The key problem with data availability, limiting the sample size in our main study from 68 to 29 countries, 7 concerns household size variables (i.e., number of persons in the household aged 18+, total number of persons in the household) as well as the "stable relationship"dummy. The size of the considered sample can be substantially expanded only if these important variables are dropped from the regressions. Moreover, unavailability of household size variables makes it also impossible to construct equivalent income and per capita income measures. As our explained variable, we can only use the original WVS scale of household earnings or its logarithm.
Since these steps increase the number of degrees of freedom only at the cost of incurring potentially severe omitted variables bias, we have decided to treat the current analysis as a robustness check. Fortunately, from Table 3 we learn that the main finding of the current study -that bridging social capital has an inverted-U shaped impact on individuals earnings -is valid for an extended set of countries as well. Signs of all other explanatory variables are also preserved. The inverted-U shaped age profile of earnings regains its statistical significance. The impact of the mean level of social trust in the respondent's reference group becomes significantly positive in OLS regressions (though again, not so anymore in the IV case). The signs of parameters for the chief wage earner, housewife, student, and retired dummies remain puzzling in the extended sample as well. 7 The exact list of countries is available upon request. Underid. p 0 0 0 0 Notes: t-statistics in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Country dummies included but not reported.
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Ordered logit results
Another robustness check of our main results consists in relaxing the assumption that the WVS scale of incomes is an interval scale, in line with its "income decile" interpretation, and assuming that it is an ordinal scale instead. In such case, the appropriate empirical methodology should be based on ordered logit/probit estimates. In the following analysis, we shall use ordered logit. Moreover, this approach also precludes the use of equivalent incomes as the explained variable (where the income decile is divided by the square root of the number of household members).
Results of the current investigation are shown in Table 4 . It turns out that the main findings of the current study are robust to the considered change in methodology. Unsurprisingly, household size is now positively related to total household earnings. The signs of all other explanatory variables are unchanged. In the most sophisticated regression equation (6), we also find that considering politics important, membership in professional associations and sports and recreational organizations, all tend to go together with higher incomes. Neither of these results should be considered as particularly surprising.
Comparison across various measures of earnings
In the course of the next robustness check, we shall also confirm the validity of our main set of findings across various measures of earnings: (i) household earnings (WVS measure), (ii) earnings per person in the household (inc pc), (iii) log earnings per person in the household (inc ln pc), and (iv) our baseline: log equivalent earnings (inc ln eq). We shall maintain the assumption that earnings are measured here with an interval scale, and estimate the regression coefficients with OLS.
As one can see in Table 5 , we confirm robustness of our main results to the variety of definitions of our explained variable. The impact of bridging social capital on earnings remains inverted-U shaped, whereas the impact of bonding social capital remains negative.
The signs of parameters relating to other control variables are preserved as well. It is noteworthy to observe that while household size has a significantly positive impact on household income (Regressions (1) and (5)), it negatively affects income per capita and equivalent income. Moreover, controlling for household size, the number of children has 25 
Role of chief wage earners
One of the biggest caveats implied by our study is the positive sign of the parameter on the chief wage earner dummy. Does this puzzling result affect the main message of the current paper? The current robustness check confirms that this is not the case.
In Table 6 we present the results of our regression analyses -both with and without a battery of additional control variables -carried out for (i) the entire population (regressions (1) and (4)), (ii) chief wage earners only (regressions (2) and (5)), and (iii) the entire population but controlling for the chief wage earner dummy (regressions (3) and (6)). The inverted-U result and the negative effect of bonding social capital are preserved across all specifications. The signs of other coefficients are also preserved.
Interactions between social capital, trust, and employment status
Finally, we have also investigated if there is any interdependence between social capital, social trust, and employment status in earnings regressions. Such interaction effects would be in line with the hypotheses put forward in our related theoretical study (Growiec and Growiec, 2014b) . In Table 7 , we present a few extensions of regressions (4) and (8) from Table 2 , allowing for extra interaction terms between both social capital variables, trust, and employment status. With slight abuse of methodology and due to the lack of reliable instruments, we treat our interaction terms as exogenous regressors.
This extension does not have much of an impact for our main results or the signs of coefficients on control variables. On the other hand, we obtain a few interesting additional findings related to the interaction terms. However, statistical significance of these estimates is not entirely robust to the choice of the estimation method, because of very strong correlations between the interaction terms and some of the interacted variables. 8 In particular, we find an interesting robust interaction effect between bonding social capital and social trust (regressions (2), (4), (6) and (8)): it turns out that the impact Underid. p 0 0 0 0 0 0 Notes: t-statistics in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Country dummies included but not reported. of trust on earnings is mediated by bonding social capital. Other, non-robust due to multicollinearity -and thus potentially questionable -effects are found for the interactions terms between employment status and both social capital variables.
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The marginal income effects of both social capital variables, social trust, and employment status, computed according to regression (8) Hence, our results suggest that if one trusts strangers, more contacts with family should increase her earnings, ceteris paribus; if one doesn't, they should lower them. If one trusts strangers and at the same time one has strong family ties, one may for example use the kinship group's resources and support to cooperate with strangers to set up a business and make greater profits out of the family resources one already has. No such effect is found for bridging social capital.
Taking Regression (8) in Table 7 literally, our findings also imply that the impact of employment status on individual earnings is the higher, the higher is the stock of individual bonding social capital or the lower is the stock of bringing social capital. Conversely, being employed diminishes the positive earnings effects of bridging, and negative effects of bonding social capital. These findings, which stand in partial agreement with the theoretical hypotheses of our related study, should be treated with caution, though: we cannot rule out that they may be due to regressor endogeneity or model misspecification.
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Conclusion
The current paper has revisited the earlier findings (reviewed in Table 1 ) that bridging social capital generally increases earnings, whereas bonding social capital decreases them.
These In one of our extensions, we have also identified significant and robust interaction effects between bonding social capital and social trust: if one trusts strangers, more contacts with family should increase her earnings; if one doesn't, they should lower them.
A methodological contribution of the current paper has been to sort out the endogeneity and omitted variables bias issues which are common, yet often overlooked problems in the related literature. We find these problems to be generally valid but not crucial for our principal research question.
What remains to be done is to collect and use panel data to draw more precise conclusions on the causal links between social capital, trust, and economic performance of individuals and countries. Unfortunately, in this respect, we are facing an unsurmountable data availability problem, at least with WVS/EVS data.
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